As I noted yesterday, the Wyden-Ryan plan on Medicare reform has elicited quite a bit of commentary, which continues today. The reaction from Dems in Congress and the White House is fairly predictable: they see Medicare as the third rail of American politics and are happy to electrocute any Republicans who try to reform it, no matter that Medicare begins going bankrupt in 2020.
The response on the right has been more nuanced. There, analysts are wondering if the plan compromises too much, and how much of an effect it will really have on Medicare spending.
Peter Suderman, writing at Reason notes that:
...the option [Wyden-Ryan] describe as "traditional" Medicare wouldn't quite be Medicare as-we-know-it. Seniors would have to buy in using capped premium support payments (similar to vouchers, but with the federal government serving as a go-between for seniors and insurers). If "traditional" Medicare couldn't hold down costs and premiums, seniors might have to spend some of their own money in order to stay in the program. The idea is to create savings through competition, on the assumption that seniors will pick plans that represent the best value for their own health needs. And, at least in theory, that's how this plan restrains the growth of Medicare: The value of the premium support payments is capped at GDP plus 1 percent, meaning that spending on the program grows only a little faster than the economy.
The political advantages of a plan like this should be obvious: Leaving a government-run Medicare option in the mix insulates the proposal from the sort of you're-killing-granny! criticism that Ryan's earlier reform plans drew. Cosponsoring the plan with a popular, health-policy focused Democrat (Wyden offered a health policy overhaul during the late Bush years that Obama mostly ignored) further insulates the plan from partisan criticism, and may even help make it politically plausible--which even the most compromised version of Ryan's plan never was--at some point in the future. More importantly, it isolates President Obama, who can be accused of ignoring a genuine bipartisan reform option if he doesn't support the joint proposal.
Peter also picks up on the same issue that I noted yesterday. Politically, the Wyden-Ryan plan muddies the water by creating a frawework for seniors that mirrors Obamacare's state based exchanges:
But there are political complications as well, for both Republicans and Democrats. The Ryan-Wyden plan looks a lot like ObamaCare with the addition of a public option. That makes it somewhat harder for Republicans to oppose last year's health care overhaul, but it also makes it more difficult for Democrats to oppose, given that they passed a law essentially doing for the middle class what Ryan-Wyden would do for seniors.
In a follow on post, Peter qualifies that even more:
Passing legislation usually requires compromise, but this one gave up a lot of ground in hopes of sparking bipartisan support for reform. And after making the sacrifice play, Ryan may not even end up with much to show for it. Senior Democratic staffers are already issuing anonymous sneers at the plan. And despite Wyden's assurances, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi has taken to warning her Twitter followers that the plan is just a sneaky attempt to kill traditional Medicare completely.
Over at NRO's the Corner, my colleague Josh Barro weighs in as well:
House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan (R) and Senator Ron Wyden (D) are out today with a joint proposal on Medicare reform, and structurally, the plan makes a lot of sense. The plan is built much like the "premium support" plan that Ryan has been advancing for the last year.
However, there are two key differences from Ryan's original proposal. One is that traditional fee-for-service Medicare would be retained as a "public option" that seniors could choose, using their premium support payments to buy insurance from the government instead of from a private insurer. The other is that the plan does not include Ryan's aggressive cap that would have held the growth in the value of Medicare benefits to CPI. As I wrote at the time, this was an implausibly low target, especially because the plan lacked accompanying cost-control measures. Wyden-Ryan aims to hold overall Medicare cost growth to GDP growth plus 1 percent, which is still ambitious but plausible.
I like this proposal structurally. What I don't like about it is another feature it keeps from Ryan's original plan-it wouldn't be effective until 2022, and then only for new retirees. That means, like Ryan's proposal before it, it saves no money this decade and almost no money in the next decade. I understand the political impulse-it avoids impacting anybody now, so maybe Ryan and Wyden won't get beaten up for taking away Granny's benefits. But this delay is still a serious mistake-reforms should be effective immediately, and for current participants as well as new ones.
Finally, Reihan Salam, notes that:
It happens that the Wyden-Ryan proposal does two things: it sets a global budget and it creates a plausible mechanism, though obviously not an assured mechanism, for introducing constructive competition that can restrain cost growth.
At its heart, Wyden-Ryan is a version of the defined benefit proposal first advanced by a (bipartisan) group of health economists, Robert F. Coulam, Roger Feldman, and Bryan E. Dowd. This post from August offers some background on the concept. Like Yuval Levin's Medicare reform proposal, however, it matches premium support to the second-cheapest plan in a market area, so that Medicare beneficiaries will have at least one cheaper plan that will offer cash back. ...
To be clear, Wyden-Ryan is a gamble that competition in urban markets will reduce costs with a global budget as a backstop. As for quality, Wyden-Ryan guarantees a certain benefit and then allows Medicare beneficiaries to pay an additional amount if they seek services of higher quality. If the gamble succeeds and the new premium support structure is able to hold down the cost of today's benefit, it seems plausible that many Medicare beneficiaries will be willing to pay top-up fees for plans that offer richer benefits.
The response to Wyden-Ryan seems to parallel the earlier response to the Simpson-Bowles deficit recommendations. From the right, a cautious embrace; on the left, lots of consternation.
The theme on the left is that any significant changes to Medicare will "end the program as we know it". Well, Medicare is unsustainable in its current format, and so ending it "as we know it" will be the only way to save it.
The right is edging towards compromise. The left doesn't see any need for compromise, at least not until after November 2012.